Utah Commonwealth Corporation Act

Where the framework first becomes law. A voluntary charter with real incentives, and an evaluation designed so that the answer can be no.

The federal instruments change the rules for everyone. The Utah Bill is different by design: it is voluntary, it rewards firms that choose stewardship rather than penalizing those that don't, and it is meant to win a first legislative session in a state whose political culture — pro-market, pro-property, skeptical of concentrated power — already holds the argument on this site as common sense. If, after several years, Commonwealth-certified companies hold up or outperform on retention, productivity, and long-term return — measured by an evaluator the program does not control — that record is what carries the framework everywhere else.

The three-tier framework

The tier structure is modeled on Colorado's employee-ownership legislation — proven incentive scaffolding without command-and-control mandates. Each tier adds obligations and unlocks additional incentives. Pay-ratio standards are embedded at each tier, using the same definitions of compensation and covered workforce as the Corporate Pay Accountability Act, so a Utah Preferred company is, by construction, inside the federal safe harbor.

TierCEO ratioNEO ratioBoard ratioKey requirementsIncentives
Registered DiscloseDiscloseDisclose Annual pay-ratio disclosure on the Act's definitions. Transparency creates market pressure. Commonwealth Charter filed with the state. Commonwealth designation.
Certified ≤50:1≤30:1≤5:1 Employee Stewardship Council. Ownership plan. AI Productivity Participation Plan. Stewardship Charter. Independent verification. Colorado-style conversion tax credits. Reduced state corporate tax rate, capped. Procurement tiebreaker.
Preferred ≤20:1≤15:1≤3:1 Full Commonwealth standards. Tenure-weighted voting. Employee board representation. Tenure-based voting rights preserved through an employee's retirement and other terminal events. Independent stewardship audit annually. Full incentive package, capped. Commonwealth Preferred designation and public recognition. Procurement tiebreaker.

The AI Productivity Participation Plan

The Certified and Preferred tiers require a plan for how productivity gains from artificial intelligence deployed inside the firm are shared with the workforce that uses it — through wages, hours, or ownership. It is the one provision anywhere in the framework whose sole purpose is the question on the full argument: when AI raises a firm's output per hour, who keeps the difference? The early evidence says workers currently do not. A Utah firm that wants the Certified designation has to answer the question in writing and be verified against the answer.

The plan is not a statement of intent. It names a baseline chosen from the Act's menu — output per hour worked, or revenue per full-time-equivalent worker, measured over the two years before certification; it states the formula by which verified gains above that baseline are shared; and it names the form of the sharing — wages, hours, ownership, or a combination. The baseline is inflation-adjusted, and the Act shares gains above it whatever their cause: it does not attempt to isolate AI's contribution, which cannot be measured inside a firm. The Act does not prescribe the form of the sharing. It prescribes that the share and the form be stated in advance, measured against the baseline by the same independent verifier that certifies the pay ratios, and reported every year — and it sets a minimum share of verified gains below which a plan does not qualify (the draft proposes one-quarter; the number is the Legislature's to set). A plan with no baseline, no formula, or no verified sharing is not a plan, and a firm that files one loses the designation.

Why Utah first

The legislature
A sponsor for the 2027 general session
Legislative relationships are in place and the bill is seeking a sponsor for the 2027 session. Utah's political culture — pro-market, pro-property-rights, skeptical of concentrated power — is aligned with the framework's posture. The argument that the surplus of an enterprise belongs to the people who own it and produce it, and not to whoever happens to run it, is a conservative argument in Utah's context, and it is made here in Utah's own vocabulary.
The tradition
Stewardship in the state's majority culture
The Commonwealth / Zion Corporation dual naming is not incidental. The United Order principles — stewardship, consecration, surplus flowing to those who contribute — map directly onto the framework's structure. The secular argument stands on its own; for readers who recognize the tradition, it deepens it.
The replication model
Utah tests it. Everyone else reads the data.
Colorado passed employee-ownership tax credits in 2021 and other states have followed with incentives of their own. Utah passes the Commonwealth Corporation Act. Five years of data follow. The hypothesis the prototype exists to test is that Commonwealth-certified companies hold up or outperform on retention, productivity, and long-term return. A voluntary program cannot prove that the Act caused the difference — the firms that opt in may have been the better-run firms already — so the evaluation is written into the Act before the first firm enrolls: pre-enrollment trends for every participant, a comparison set of similar Utah firms that did not opt in, an evaluator independent of the program (the Office of the Legislative Auditor General or a Utah university), and publication of the results whether or not they favor the Act. What a pilot can establish is that the model is workable and does no harm. That is the claim Utah's data will be asked to carry, and the federal ladder's case rests on the federal evidence, not on Utah's.

How this gets gamed, and what stops it

A voluntary program invites a different kind of gaming than a mandate: joining for the benefits without the substance. Four ways to do it, and what the Act does about each.

Capture 01
The expensive badge
A large company forms an Employee Stewardship Council with no authority, files an AI plan with no targets, hires a certifier, and collects the reduced tax rate and the procurement preference. The workforce receives nothing it did not already have.
The fix
Certification is of what was done in the year, not of what was planned. The council's authority is specified in the Act — information rights, a seat in the pay-setting process, a vote on the AI plan. The AI plan needs a baseline, a formula, and verified sharing. A failed verification decertifies the firm automatically, with recapture of the year's benefits.
Capture 02
The subsidy
A company reorganizes into Preferred status and collects a credit larger than the value of anything it changed. Utah taxpayers end up paying for behavior that would have happened anyway.
The fix
Credits and the rate reduction are capped per firm and in aggregate, as Colorado's credits are. Recipients and amounts are public. A firm that misrepresents its qualifications repays the benefit with interest. An independent cost-benefit review goes to the Legislature every two years; the incentive titles sunset after the five-year evaluation unless renewed on it.
Capture 03
The procurement thumb
A procurement preference large enough to matter invites inflated bids, and rewards something unrelated to how well the contract will be performed.
The fix
The preference operates inside the Utah Procurement Code's existing preference provisions as a tiebreaker among otherwise equivalent responsive bids — not a price advantage — and yields to any federal-funding rule that forbids it.
Capture 04
The pilot that proves what it assumed
The firms that opt in were the better-run firms to begin with. Five years later they outperform, and the Act takes the credit.
The fix
The evaluation is specified before enrollment — pre-enrollment trends, a comparison set of non-participants, an independent evaluator, results published either way — and the page above says what a voluntary pilot can and cannot show.

Commonwealth-washing prohibition

The Act includes an explicit anti-greenwashing provision modeled on benefit-corporation enforcement. Any company claiming Commonwealth status without meeting the verified requirements faces civil penalties, mandatory public correction, and repayment of any incentive received. The designation must mean something or it means nothing.

What to watch
Whether the Act finds a sponsor for Utah's 2027 general session is the first test of whether the fifth pillar of the American System — keeping the gains of a rebuilt economy in the household, alongside the four being rebuilt now in tariffs, the border, the hemisphere, and the dollar — gets built the way the other four are being built: in law. If you are a Utah resident, find your legislator and send them this page.

The draft text

Version 2 of the Act — the three-tier framework — is a discussion draft for legislative review and is available on request. Version 3, which carries the October 2026 revisions on this page — the AI plan's baseline and verification requirements; the incentive caps, disclosure, and recapture; the procurement tiebreaker; and the pre-specified evaluation — is in preparation for the 2027 session. Comments welcome, particularly from Utah employers who would consider the Certified or Preferred designation and from practitioners who have worked with Colorado's employee-ownership credits.

Request the Version 2 draft Comment on the draft
Utah Commonwealth Corporation Act, Version 2 — three-tier framework; Version 3 in preparation. Discussion draft. Comments welcome. Not for citation as enacted or introduced law. Colorado precedent: Colorado Employee Ownership Tax Credit, C.R.S. 39-22-542 (2021) and successor programs. Procurement preferences: Utah Procurement Code, Utah Code Title 63G, Chapter 6a, Part 10. Evaluation: Office of the Legislative Auditor General, Utah Code Title 36, Chapter 12.